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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
The issue before the Court is whether an estate may recover against a defendant for
property of the decedent that was held in trust, where the decedent was deprived of the
distribution of such prope1iy solely through the wrongful acts of the defendant. More
paiiicularly, the Court must determine whether its opinion of Bishop v. Owens established an
absolute and universal bar to recovery for any claim that could be characterized as a tort claim
when the injured party dies before judgment. If the Bishop v. Owens opinion did establish such
an absolute and universal rule oflaw, then the defendant in this case will have succeeded in not
only dep1iving her brother of his property, but also taking it as her own. If, however, the Court
finds that the Bishop v. Owens opinion did not eliminate the well-recognized exceptions to the
rule of abatement, then this matter should be remanded and the estate should be allowed to
pursue recovery of the property that the defendant wrongfully withheld from the decedent.
This case is about the actions of Toni C. Johnson while she served as the successor
trustee for her parents of The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M.
Cornell ("Trust"). Ms. Johnson had one duty when she became the successor trustee of her
parents' trust: distribute the assets to her and her brother, John Cornell. Instead of fulfilling her
duty, Ms. Johnson refused to distribute the assets over two and a half years. She repeatedly made
improper use of the assets for her own benefit and engaged in inequitable conduct in order to
deprive her brother of his property. Finally, having failed in his attempts to persuade his sister to
act in accordance with her duties, John Cornell petitioned the court for relief in July of 2012.
Tragically, he died the following month before he could obtain a judgment for relief.
In response to her brother's death, Ms. Johnson filed a motion to dismiss. She did not
argue that she had acted properly. She did not argue that her brother was not entitled to the
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prope1iy under the terms of the Trust. She did not argue that she had honored the instructions of
the Trust or her duties to her brother. Instead, Ms. Johnson argued that because she was the sole
surviving child, she acquired all of the propeliy that was intended for her brother. She reasoned
that her brother's estate could only pursue his property through a t01i claim and that such claim
abated at his death under the Supreme Couli case of Bishop v. Owens. In sum, she reasoned that
because she succeeded in depriving her brother of his propeliy until his death, she had the right
to retain his property after his death.
This Court must detern1ine whether Idaho law pennits Ms. Johnson to deprive the Estate
of John Cornell ("Estate") of propeliy that was \Vrongfully withheld and wrongfully diminished
only through the misdeeds of Ms. Johnson.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
The Estate appeals from dismissal of its Petition for supervised administration and courtordered distribution of The Revocable Family Trust of Michael S. Cornell and Arlie M. Cornell.
The magistrate couli dismissed the Petition on the grounds that the Estate's claims did not
survive the death of John Henry Cornell. The District Court affirmed. Petitioner appeals.
B. Course of Proceedings

The case identified by case number CV 2012-2 77 in Clearwater County was initiated
through a Petition filed by John Henry Cornell on July 11, 2012. Jolm Cornell died from an
apparent suicide on August 20, 2012. Ms. Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 17,
2012, arguing that the claims in John Cornell's Petition abated upon his death. Ms. Johnson also
argued that because John died, there existed no legitimate paiiy in interest unless and until the
Estate was substituted into the action pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(l).
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Kareen Cornell is the widow of John Cornell and the Personal Representative of the
Estate. The attorney who represented John Cornell when he was living continued to prosecute
the Petition in John Cornell's name, personally. In late November 2012, Ms. Cornell appeared
before the magistrate court and notified the court that she objected to any other person acting on
behalf of her late husband. While the magistrate court invited Ms. Cornell to submit briefing on
the pending action, it did not bring her or the Estate into the litigation. Thus, Ms. Cornell's
briefing was, in effect, amici briefing. On February 15, 2013, the magistrate court dismissed the
Petition filed by John Cornell, personally, but expressly invited Ms. Cornell to file claims on
behalf of the Estate.
Ms. Cornell responded to the Court's invitation by filing the Estate's Petition on
February 28, 2013. While many of the Estate's claims were identical to those raised by John
Cornell in his August 2012 petition, the Estate also raised additional claims.

The Estate's

Petition alleged that Ms. Johnson (1) failed to act in confonnity with the terms of the Trust;
(2) breached her fiduciary duties when acting in her capacity as Trustee; (3) engaged in equitable
conversion of the property belonging to John Cornell by refusing to distribute the property; and
(4) was unjustly enriched by misusing Trust assets for personal desires and refusing to comply
with the terms of the Trust and her fiduciary duties in order to effect a distribution in her favor.
The Estate sought supervised administration, court-ordered distribution of the Trust, and a
judgment against Ms. Johnson for injuries caused to the Estate.

The Petition set forth the

following legal and equitable causes of action: (A) breach of fiduciary duty; (B) constructive
trust; (C) breach of contract; (D) conversion; and (E) unjust enrichment.
No Answer has ever been filed to those allegations. Instead, Ms. Johnson filed a Motion
to Dismiss the Estate's Petition on March 1, 2013. The magistrate court granted Ms. Johnson's
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motion on June 21, 2013. The magistrate court based its ruling upon the following conclusions of
law: (1) the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion of Bishop v. Owens, 152 Idaho 616,619 (2012) stands
for the universal and absolute mle that all claims sounding in tort abate at common law upon the
death of the claimant; and (2) the Idaho legislature did not abrogate that rule with the amendment
of Idaho Code § 5-327, except for claims for recovery of medical expenses, out-of-pocket
expenses, and lost wages.
The Estate appealed to the district court, and the matter was remanded with instructions
that the magistrate court to first determine whether Toni Johnson ought to be removed as trustee.
On remand, the magistrate court ruled that there were no persons with standing to request
removal, because John Cornell's claims abated when he died. The court's abatement ruling was
substantially identical to its earlier dismissal. The district court affinned.

C. Statement of Facts
Michael and Arlie Cornell established the Trust on November 1, 1996. 1 The Trust
provided for Michael and Arlie during their lifetimes, with the remainder to be distributed
equally to their two children: Toni Johnson and John Comell. 2

Arlie Cornell died on

November 9, 2008. 3 Michael Cornell died on December 15, 2009. 4 Ms. Johnson has been the
sole Trustee since that time. 5
As a successor trustee, Ms. Johnson's sole duty was to distribute the trust assets; half to
her and half to her brother:
On the death of the surviving Trustor, the Trust shall terminate and the
Trustee shall, as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and

1 R.

Vol. I, pp. 29-52 (Trust documents).
Id. at p. 35.
3 Id.atp.100.
4 Id.
5 Id. at p. 51 (First Amendment to Trust naming Ms. Johnson successor trustee).
2
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principal remaining in the Trust into two (2) equal shares and distribute
them to the following beneficiaries: TONI C. JOHNSON and JOHN H.
CORNELL.
Trust§ 4.03. 6 It is undisputed that Ms. Johnson never made any such distribution.

The magistrate court found that Ms. Johnson "egregiously wronged her brother during his
lifetime." 7 Over the years she served as successor trustee, John Cornell repeatedly requested
information regarding the Trust and requested its distribution. 8 "Mr. Cornell contacted Ms.
Johnson and her attorney, a different attorney than her present attorney, several times for
accountings and for word on the status of the trust. He never received a response." 9 He "waited
in vain" for any sort of distribution that could help "pay for necessary medical care that he could
not obtain without money from the trust." 10 Meanwhile, Ms. Johnson was living in the Trust
home rent free. 11 "Ms. Johnson used funds from the trust for her personal expenses while Mr.
Cornell was making his requests for information regarding distribution of the trust." 12 She
commingled Trust cash with her own, and then spent all the cash assets she commingled for her
living expenses and expenses incurred maintaining and paying for the property on which she
lived. 13 "Ms. Jolmson acted inappropriately in bestowing the proceeds of the trust upon herself
and not shar[ing] one cent with her brother." 14

John Cornell was never able to compel

distribution before his death on August 20, 2012.
Ms. Johnson has argued that because Mr. Cornell died before he was able to compel

Id. at 35.
.
Id. at p. 603 (Magistrate Court's September 2013 Memorandum Opinion re: Attorney Fees and
Costs).
8 Id. atpp. 116-17, 126-38.
9 Id. at pp. 602-03.
10 Id. at pp. 602-03.
II Id.
12 Id. at p. 603.
13 Id. at p. 429.
14 Id. at p. 603.
6

7
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distribution of the Trust, he held no prope1iy interest in the Trust assets. She bases this argument
upon the following distiibution language found in the Trust document:
If any child ... should die piior to the above distribution, then the Trustee
shall distribute all of such deceased child's share to his or her surviving
issue in equal shares .... If there is no surviving issue, then all of the
deceased child's share of the Trust Estate shall be added to the shares set
aside for the ... other living child .... "

Trust § 4.03(a). 15 It is undisputed that John Cornell died without issue; the Personal
Representative of his Estate is his widow.
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

May the Estate pursue the property wrongfully withheld from John Cornell duiing his life

by Toni Johnson?
ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review

The magistrate comi dismissed this action on a summary judgment standard, because it
considered affidavits filed by the parties.

See Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c).

exercises de novo review over a grant of summary judgment.

An appellate court

Constr. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v.

Assurance Co. ofAm., 135 Idaho 680, 682, 23 P.3d 142, 144 (2001).
Summary judgment is only appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving paiiy is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P.
56(c). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the "Comi will liberally construe all
disputed facts in favor of the nomnoving paiiy, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from the record will be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party." Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho
399, 403, 195 P.3d 1212, 1216 (2008). "Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable

15

Id. at p. 35
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persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence
presented." ivfcPheters v. J,.![aile, 138 Idaho 391, 394, 64 P.3d 317, 320 (2003).
B.

The Estate's Causes of Action Did Not Abate at Common Law.

The Estate's Petition sets forth several causes of action in law and in equity. This Court
has long held that, as a general rule at common law, tort claims abate upon the death of the
injured party. See Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415,418, 184 P. 477,477 (1919). This Court has
also long held that this general rule is subject to several well-recognized exceptions. Id. Four
such exceptions provide for the survival of the Estate's claim in this case. First, tort claims
survive where the claim is one for injury to property. Second, tort claims survive where the
action is founded in contract. Third, the to1i claims survive where the claim is based upon breach
of a duty established by a remedial statute. Fomih, tort claims survive where the action exists in
equity.
The test for detennining whether a claim survives "is, not so much the form of the action,
as the nature of the cause of action." Id. (quoting Lee's Administrator v. Hill, 87 Va. 497, 12 S.E.
1052 (1891)). Claims for injuries "which affect[] the person only, and not the estate," generally
abate. Id. Examples of such claims are assault, libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false
imprisonment, and the like. See id. See also MacLeod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho 64, 75, 249 P. 254, 257
(1926).
1. The Estate's tort claims did not abate because the claims seek redress for

injury to property.
The first applicable exception to the general rule of abatement is that "an injury which
lessens the estate of the injured party does survive .... " MacLeod, 43 Idaho at 75,249 P. at 257.
In Macleod, the Court considered whether claims for fraudulent representation of the value of a
business were assignable.

43 Idaho at 69, 249 P. at 255.
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The Court looked to the law of

survival, because "[t]he assignability of a cause of action is ... intimately associated with, and in
most cases held to depend upon, the same principle as the survival of a cause of action." Id. at
75, 249 P. at 257.

The Court adopted the rule that a claim for injury that "result[s] in the

diminution of the estate of the injured party, survives and is assignable." Id. In Macleod, the
Court found that claims for injury as a result of paying too much for a business based upon false
representations by the defendant were claims for injury to property and, therefore, survived. Id.
at 76, 249 P. at 257.

The rule and reasoning of Macleod were recently reaffirmed and

commended as reliable precedent in this Court's 2013 opinion of St. Luke's .Magic Valley Reg'l
Med. Ctr. v. Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 41,293 P.3d 661, 665 (2013).
Nor is Idaho alone in holding injury to property is an exception to abatement. American
Jurisprudence states that: "At common law survivable actions are those in which the wrong
complained of affects primarily property and property rights, and in which any injury to the
person is incidental, while nonsurvivable actions are those in which the injury complained of is
to the person and any effect on property or property rights is incidental." 1 Am. Jur. 2d
Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 51.
Therefore, if the Estate's claims are for an injury to property, then the claims survive and
the matter should be remanded. The Defendant has argued that the Estate cannot be claiming an
injury to property, because John Cornell had no right to the Trust assets unless he survived
distribution. However, while John Cornell may not have had a vested interest in the Trust
immediately upon his parents' death, his interest vested when the Defendant engaged in
inequitable conduct to delay distribution.
"Unless contrary to settled principles of law, the intentions of a trust's settlors must
control in actions involving the trust." Carl H. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133

-8-

Idaho 866, 873, 993 P.2d 1197, 1204 (1999). If the settlors' intent is ambiguous, then the issue of
the settlors' intent is an issue of fact, which focuses on the intent of the settlors, and may not be
resolvable at summary judgment. Id. at 873-74, 993 P.2d at 1204-05. "In detennining whether a
document is ambiguous, the Court seeks to detennine whether it is 'reasonably subject to
conflicting interpretation.' Id. (quoting Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 997, 829 P.2d 1342, 1346
(1992)).
Here, settlors Michael and Arlie Cornell directed the Trust to tem1inate immediately upon
the death of the surviving spouse. R. Vol. I, p. 35. The settlors directed the successor trustee to,
"as soon as reasonably possible, divide the net income and principal remaining in the Trust into
two (2) equal shares and distribute them to the following beneficiaries: TONI C. JOHNSON and
JOHN H. CORNELL." Id. The following paragraph then contains a distribution survivorship
clause. If a beneficiary failed to survive distribution, then that beneficiary's share was to be
distributed to his or her issue.

Id. If the pre-deceasing beneficiary left no issue, then the

beneficiary's share was to be distributed to the surviving beneficiary. Id. It is undisputed that
John Cornell died before distribution and that he left no issue. This forms the basis of
Defendant's argument in this case and her claim to the entirety of the Trust assets.
Idaho courts have addressed the validity of distribution survivorship clauses

111

the

context of will interpretations. See Allen v. Shea, 105 Idaho 31,665 P.2d 1041 (1983); Hintze v.
Black, 125 Idaho 655, 873 P.2d 909 (Ct. App. 1994). In Allen, the testator's distribution to his

wife was conditioned upon her survival of the distribution of his estate. 105 Idaho at 32, 665
P .2d at 1042. The wife served as personal representative of the testator's estate, but died before
she could accomplish distribution of the estate. Id. The Supreme Court held that the testator had
clearly expressed his intent that his wife's interest in the estate did not vest until distribution had
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been completed. Id. at 33, 665 P .2d at 1041. The Court of Appeals followed this precedent in
Hintze, holding that a husband's gift failed to vest where the testator included a distribution
survivorship clause and the husband failed to survive distribution. Hintze, 125 Idaho at 658, 873
P.2d at 912.
The Estate discovered no case where the Idaho courts have been presented with the facts
where a personal representative or trustee unreasonably delays distribution. However, both Allen
and Hintze suggest that vesting should be found where the personal representative or trustee does
unreasonably delay distribution. Both the Allen Court and the Hintze Court consider California
case law that sets forth the rule that vesting cannot be postponed by the unreasonable delay in
distribution. See Allen, 105 Idaho at 34, 665 P.2d at 1044; Hintze, 125 Idaho at 659, 873 P.2d at
913 (analyzing In re Estate of Taylor, 66 Cal.2d 855, 428 P.2d 301 (1967). Neither the Allen
Court nor the Hintze Court reject the rule of law that vesting should be found where there is
unreasonable delay; they implicitly recognize the validity of that rule of law. Id. Instead, the
Allen Court and the Hintze Court explain that the facts of the case before those courts did not
include evidence of undue delay. See Allen, 105 Idaho at 34-35, 665 P.2d at 1044-45 (finding
"substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's finding that [there was no
unreasonable delay]"); Hintze, 125 Idaho at 659, 873 P.2d at 913 ("the authority on which the
personal representatives rely for this policy argument, [In re Estate of Taylor] involved
unreasonable delay by the administratrix in distributing the estate, a factor clearly not present
here").
Here, the Court is presented with clear facts of unreasonable delay and an oppmiunity to
expressly adopt the rule which Allen and Hintze assume: that contingent interests will be deemed
to vest where there is unreasonable delay. Such a rule does not frustrate the purpose of the
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settlor, but rather carries out the presumed intent-that the desired beneficiary would receive his
or her distribution so long as she survived the time reasonably necessary to make distribution.

See In re Estate of Taylor, 66 Cal.2d at 858, 428 P.2d at 303. 16 Furthennore, the rule encourages
prompt distribution upon instruction by a trust and discourages the sort of dilatory conduct that
occurred here. In this case, the Magistrate Court actually found that the Defendant's conduct
:frustrated the clear intent of the settlors:
Ms. Johnson used funds from the trust for her personal expenses while
Mr. Cornell was making his requests for information regarding distribution of the
trust. Ms. Johnson lived rent free in the home that is included in the Trust.
Ms. Johnson entirely thwarted the intentions of her parents in establishing the
trust for her brother to receive half the estate. Ms. Johnson dishonored the trust
her father placed in her when he named her as the sole person responsible for
distribution of the trust. Ms. Johnson acted inappropriately in bestowing the
proceeds of the trust upon herself and not share one cent with her brother.
Ms. Johnson egregiously wronged her brother during his lifetime. Now
she wishes to continue wronging her brother after his death by not only keeping
the assets that were intended for Mr. Cornell, but also raiding his estate for her
attorney fees. Certainly, this is not the result that the parents of Mr. Cornell and
Ms. Johnson intended when they created the trust.
R. Vol. I, p. 603.
Finally, even if John Cornell's interest had never vested, he still held a property interest
that was damaged by the conduct of the Defendant. "A trust is not itself a separate legal entity
that can own property; rather, it is a relationship having certain attributes." In re Thonipson, 454
B.R. 486, 492 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011). "A trust creates a fiduciary relationship in which the
trustee is the holder of legal title to the property subject to the beneficial interest of the
beneficiary." DESI/TRI V v. Bender, 130 Idaho 796, 808, 948 P.2d 151, 163 (1997). Here, the
Defendant sought to totally deprive the decedent of his beneficial interest in the Trust assets.

The In re Taylor's Estate Opinion also sets for the historic and widespread adoption of the rule
that vesting occurs upon the occurrence of undue delay. 66 Cal.2d at 859,428 P.2d at 303.
16
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2. The Estate's tort claims did not abate because the claims are founded in
contract.
The second applicable exception to the general rule of abatement is that the tort claim is
not "unconnected with contract" but rather "is founded on a contract" such that it is "virtually ex
contractu, although nominally in tort, and there it survives." Kloepfer, 32 Idaho at 418, 184 P. at

477. Here, the tort claims are based upon a relationship that is founded in contract. The
relationship between a trustee and a beneficiary is contractual in nature. See In re Thompson,
454 B.R. 486, 492 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2011 ); and DB SI/TRI V v. Bender, 130 Idaho 796, 808, 948
P.2d 151, 163 (1997). The scope and nature of that relationship is defined by the terms of the
trust, i.e., the contract.
The Estate has identified specific provisions within the Trust that Defendant breached.
4.03 & 4.04:

The Trust tem1inates automatically upon the death of the surviving Trustor
and the successor Trustee is to distribute the prope1iy "as soon as
reasonably possible."

5.01:

The only property which may be retained in the Trust after the death of the
surviving Trustor is property productive of income.

8.02:

The successor Trustee shall render an accounting from time to time.

The Magistrate Court dismissed these claims, interpreting Bishop as standing for the rule that
where claims for recovery existed in tort, all such claims should be characterized as tort claims
and found to abate upon the death of the injured party. R. Vol. I, p. 493-94. However, as set
forth above, the Kloepfer opinion expressly recognizes that some tort claims may be contractual
in nature and, therefore, survive.
In fact, the Bishop opinion also recognizes this possibility. Furthern1ore, the contract
claims identified by the Estate in this matter are far different than those pursued in Bishop. The
question before the Court in Bishop was whether the decedent could pursue a legal malpractice
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action through breach of contract claims. Bishop, 152 Idaho at 620, 272 P.3d at 1251. The
plaintiff argued that it could either sue for legal malpractice or for breach of the legal
representation agreement. Id. The Bishop Court actually held this theory conect. See id. The
Court rejected the plaintiffs breach of contract claims, however, because the plaintiff had not
alleged breach of a specific tern1 within the contract, but instead alleged breach of the term
referencing the common law duties owed by every attorney to that attorney's clients. Id. at 621,
272 P.3d at 1252. The Bishop Court explained that if such a provision were enough to transform
the pure tort action of legal malpractice into a breach of contract action, there would exist "a per
se breach of contract action in every legal malpractice action." Id. The relationship between
attorney and client is not contractual in nature. Id. at 620, 272 P.3d at 1251. Here, the Estate's
claims are far different; the Estate has identified clear and distinct terms in the Trust that the
Defendant wholly and willfully breached.
3. The Estate's tort claims did not abate because the claims are founded
upon a remedial statute.
A third exception to the general rule of abatement is that claims based upon protections
granted by remedial statutes survive the death of the injured party. "A cause of action that is
founded on a remedial statute, as opposed to one that is penal in nature, survives the death of the
party possessing the cause of action." 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 59.
Because the Estate's claims are for protections recognized by remedial statutes, the claims
survive under this exception.
Chapter 7 of Title 15 of the Idaho Code sets forth the standards governmg the
administration of trusts. Chapter 8, the Idaho Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act ("Act"),
sets forth the manner of resolving disputes regarding trust administration. The Idaho legislature
expressly set forth the remedial nature of the Act. Its stated intent was to grant the courts "full

-13-

and ample power and authority" to settle "[a]11 trusts and trust matters." Idaho Code § 15-8-102.
The legislature provided that, in the case of doubt, "the comi nevertheless has full power and
authority to proceed with such administration and settlement in any manner and way that to the
court seems right and proper . . . . " Id. Further, the Act grants broad standing to interested
pmiies, so that they might obtain judicial relief. See Idaho Code § 15-8-201. The facts of this
case call for the courts to exercise the power, authority, and broad discretion given them by these
remedial statutes to effect a result that is right and proper-a result that gives the heirs of John
Cornell those assets which were wrongfully withheld and diminished by the wrongful conduct of
the Defendant when she served as successor Trustee.

4. The Estate's equitable claims did not abate.
A fourth exception to the general rule of abatement is that claims in equity survive the
death of the injured pmiy. "In equity, abatement signifies a present, temporary suspension of
fu1iher proceedings in a suit because of want of proper parties. It is an interruption or suspension
of a suit, the equivalent of a stay of proceedings, and the suit may be revived and proceed to its
regular determination." 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival,_ and Revival § I (footnotes omitted).
The p1inciple that a cause of action expires with the death or disability of a party
generally does not apply to suits in equity; equitable remedies exist to the same
extent in favor of and against executors and administrators as they do against
the decedent, as long as the court can continue to grant effective relief in spite of
the death. One of the main reasons for this stance for suits in equity is that
such suits primarily pertain to property rights.
1 Am. Jur. 2d Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 60 (emphases added) (footnotes omitted). 17
The Estate has raised several equitable claims entitling it to relief.

See also Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merch. Ass'n, 128 F.2d 645,649 (4th Cir. 1942);
Glojek v. Glojek, 254 Wis. 109, 115, 35 N.W.2d 203,206 (1948); Hughey v. Mooney, 282 S.C.
597, 602, 320 S.E.2d 475, 477 (Ct. App. 1984); Miller v. Hayman, 766 So. 2d 1116, 1118 n.l
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
17
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Conversion. ''At common law, the right to bring an action for the conversion of goods in

the lifetime of the decedent owner generally survived to the personal representative .... " 1 Am.
Jur. 2d Abatement, Sun1ival, and Revival § 76. Idaho law defines conversion as "[t]he act of
wrongfully and permanently depriving someone of his prope1iy." In re Pangburn, 154 Idaho
233,296 P.3d 1080, 1085 (2013). These are the exact elements alleged by the Estate.
Constructive Trust. It is "the fundamental rule of equity that equity regards that as done

which ought to be done." See First Sec. Bank of Idaho, 91 Idaho 654, 657, 429 P.2d 386, 389
(1967) (discussing basis of doctrine of equitable conversion). When property has been acquired
in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the
beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee." TRUST, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.
2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Hanger v. Hess, 49 Idaho 325,
328, 288 P. 160, 161 (1930). Thus, the doctrine of constructive tmst is a description of the
nature by which a wrongdoer holds the property of another; the court deems that property as
already belonging to the injured party at some earlier point in time. While the Idaho Supreme
Court has not expressly addressed the issue of survival of constructive tmst claims at common
law, it presumed their survival in Brasch v. Brasch, 55 Idaho 777, 47 P.2d 676, 678 (1935).
Under the equitable doctrine of constructive trust, the express trust was terminated on the
date at which the assets should have been distributed, and a separate constructive trust arose. The
terms of that constructive trust were solely that the property belonged to John Cornell and that
the Defendant was nothing more than a trustee over that property. It is undisputed that Ms.
Johnson engaged in inequitable conduct by retaining legal title to the assets of the Trust in the
name of the Trust. Certainly, reasonable persons could find that a constructive trust arose prior to
John Cornell's death, based upon (i) the extended period of time between the death of Michael
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Cornell and the death of John Cornell; and (ii) the undisputed inequitable conduct by Ms.
Johnson.
Unjust Enrichment. "Unjust enrichment occurs where [the offending paiiy] receives a

benefit which would be inequitable to retain without compensating the [injured paiiy] to the
extent that retention is unjust." Vande,ford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 557, 165 P.3d
261, 271 (2007). The damages available to the claimant on an unjust emichment claim is the
value of the amount by which the offending party was unjustly enriched. Bany v. Pac. W
Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004). Like constructive trust, unjust
enrichment is an equitable doctiine that seeks to return to the injured party those amounts which
were due to him or her in equity; amounts which equity deems property of the injured party.
5. Bishop v. Owens did not establish a universal and absolute rule of
abatement.

The magistrate comi granted judgment against the Estate based upon its interpretation of
Bishop v. Owens as establishing precedent that, at common law, every cause of action sounding
in tmi abates upon the death of the injured paiiy. R. Vol. I, p. 490. The magistrate court found
the following language dispositive: "Under the common law, claims arising out of contracts
generally survive the death of the claimant, while those sounding in pure tort abate." 152 Idaho
616, 619, 272 P.3d 1247, 1250 (2012). While the quoted language from Bishop establishes the
general rule, the Bishop Opinion does not-either by its language or its facts-stand for the
proposition that the rule of abatement is universal and absolute. First, the very language of the
Bishop Opinion states that the Court is reciting the general rule governing survival. Id. Second,
the Bishop Court supported that general rule by citation to Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 184
P. 477 (1919). Kloepfer makes express that which Bishop assumes: "As a general rule, in the
absence of a statute providing otherwise, causes of action ex contractu survive, while causes ex
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delicto do not. However, there are well-recognized exceptions to both branches of the rule."
Id. (emphasis added).
Fmihennore, the post-Bishop opinion of St. Luke's Magic Valley Reg'! A1ed. Ctr. v.

Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 293 P.3d 661 (2013) does not support an interpretation that Bishop
established an absolute and universal rule of abatement. In Luciani, the Court addressed whether
a universal and absolute prohibition to assigning legal malpractice claims exists at common law.

Id. at 41-43, 293 P.3d at 665-67. The Court held that while the general rule was one of nonassignability, it was not an absolute prohibition. Id. The Court based its holding, in large part,
upon the survival analysis set forth in MacLeod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho 64, 249 P. 254 (1926). Id. As
set forth above, Macleod recognizes the exception language of Kleopfer and expressly holds
exceptions exist to the general rule of abatement. A1acLeod, 43 Idaho at 75, 249 P. at 257. Of
particular note, the Luciani Court considered and reaffirmed MacLeod while considering
arguments from the defendant which were based upon the language of the Bishop Opinion. Id. at
43, 293 P3d at 667.
C.

The Estate's Causes of Action Did Not Abate Under Idaho Code§ 5-327(2).

The magistrate comi held that Idaho Code § 5-327 applies to all claims of the Estate
arising after July 1, 2010. The court interpreted the statute as barring all damages potentially
recoverable to the Estate and, therefore, abating the claims. The magistrate court erred because
(1) Idaho Code§ 5-327 does not apply to the claims raised by the Estate in the case; and (2) even
if Idaho Code § 5-327 were to apply, it would not bar the Estate from recovery for the property
damage inflicted by the Defendant in this case.
Up until its latest amendment, Idaho Code § 5-327 did not address survival of a claim
upon the death of the injured party. On July 1, 2010, the Idaho legislature adopted amendments
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to the statute, providing for survival of ce1iain claims upon the death of the injured pmiy and
adding subsection designations. Idaho Code § 5-327 statuto1y note. Idaho Code § 5-327(2) now
states:
A cause of action for personal injury or prope1iy damage caused by the wrongful
act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of the injured person
from causes not related to the wrongful act or negligence. Provided however, that
the damages that may be recovered in such action are expressly limited to those
for: (i) medical expenses actually incurred, (ii) other out-of-pocket expenses
actually incurred, and (iii) loss of earnings actually suffered, prior to the death of
such injured person and as a result of the wrongful act or negligence. Such action
shall be commenced or, if already commenced at the time of the death of the
injured person, shall be thereafter prosecuted by the personal representative of the
estate of the deceased person or, if there be no personal representative appointed,
then by those persons who would be entitled to succeed to the property of the
deceased person according to the provisions of section 5-311 (2)(a), Idaho Code.
Idaho Code § 5-327(2). The magistrate court reasoned that because the first sentence included
the term "property damage" and because the limitation of the second sentence is not expressly
limited to the antecedent of "personal injury" claims, the Estate could only seek "medical
expense," "out-of-pocket expenses," or "loss of earnings" for claims arising after July 1, 2010.
Because it found that the Estate was not seeking such damages, it ruled that the Estate's claims
abated under the statute.
When interpreting statutes, Idaho courts look to the intent of the legislature, and apply
common sense and reason. See Smith v. Dep 't of Employment, 100 Idaho 520, 522, 602 P.2d 18,
20 (1979). A review of legislative history and the language of the statute reveals that the Idaho
legislature never intended for Idaho Code § 5-327(2) to apply to cases unrelated to personal
injury actions. The discussion of the amendment before the Senate Judiciary and Rules
Committee and the House Judiciary, Rules and Administration Committee centered around
preserving the right of an estate to pursue "medical expenses and other actual economic losses"
against the liability insurer of the tortfeasor. See Appendix- Idaho App. R. 35(/). The Statement

-18-

of Purpose associated with the bill explains that the amendment "will require liability insurance
companies to pay for economic losses they have insured instead of requiring the children and
other heirs ... to pay the medical bills and other expenses that were incurred because of the
carelessness of another person." Id. The statute only mentions property damage in the context of
economic injuries attributable to a personal injury action, such as a motor vehicle collision.
This legislative history explains why an application of the language of the statute to the
claims of this case is so unworkable.

The limitation on recoverable damages in the second

sentence begins with "medical expenses," a category that applies to personal injury claims, not
prope1iy damage claims. "In determining legislative intent, this Court applies the maxim noscitur
a sociis, which means 'a word is known by the company it keeps."' State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho

863,867,264 P.3d 970, 974 (2011). The maxim of noscitur a sociis requires that the category of
recoverable damages be interpreted in like category to medical expenses. An interpretation in
accordance with that maxim makes clear that the intent of the legislature was to preserve
economic damages for personal injury claims, not to limit recovery for such claims solely to
economic harm suffered.
Even if the Court were to hold that Idaho Code § 5-327(2) applies to the claims in this
case, the intent of the legislature compels an interpretation that permits recovery in this matter.
The legislature intended to preserve claims for economic damages, not to prohibit them. As set
forth in the Statement of Purpose, the legislature sought to protect estates and heirs from paying
for economic damages caused by another. If the magistrate court is correct in its application and
interpretation of the statute, then the legislature established the survival of property damage
claims in the first sentence of the subsection, only to eliminate recovery for the large majority of
those claims through the second sentence. Such an interpretation does not make sense either with
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the clear intent of the legislature or with the language of the statute. If the statute truly applied
and if the second sentence truly limits recovery on prope1iy damage claims, then legislative
intent would dictate an interpretation that finds property claims fully-recoverable as "other outof-pocket expenses."
CONCLUSION

The issue before the Court is whether Idaho courts will pennit the Defendant to retain all
the assets of the Trust and avoid any responsibility for her misuse of the Trust assets, simply
because her brother died before he could have her brought to account. That result cannot be
approved at law or at equity. Idaho courts have long recognized that the doct1ine of abatement
does not preclude an estate from pursuing the type of claims raised in this case. The Estate
appeals to this Court to reverse the ruling of the magistrate court and remand this matter for
further proceedings.
DATED this 28th day of April, 2015.
CREASON, MOORE, DOKKEN & GEIDL, PLLC

~uel~
/ .~
T. Creason, ISBN: 8183
orneys for Appellant

-20-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned does hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S
BRIEF were served by the method indicated below and addressed to the following:
Karin Seubert
Jones, Brower & Callery, P.L.L.C.
1304 Idaho Street
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501

- -X- - -

DATED this 28th day of April, 2015.

-21-

FIRST-CLASS MAIL
HAND DELIVERED
OVERNIGHT MAIL
FAX TRANSMISSION

APPENDIX
Idaho Appellate Rule 35(f)

Senate Judiciary & Rules Committee
Minutes

2010

MINUTES

SENATE JUDICIARY AND RULES COMMITTEE

DATE:

February 10, 2010

TIME:

1:30 p.m.

PLACE:

RoomWW54

MEMBERS
PRESENT:

Chairman Darrington, Vice Chairman Jorgenson, Senators Lodge, Hill,
McKague, Mortimer, Kelly, and Bock

MEMBERS
ABSENT/
EXCUSED:

Senator Davis

GUESTS:

The sign-in sheet, testimonies, and other related materials will be retained
with the minutes in the committee's office until the end of the session and
will then be located on file with the minutes in the Legislative Services
Library.

CONVENED:

Chairman Darrington called the meeting to order at 1:30 p.m.

MINUTES:

Senator Kelly made a motion to approve the minutes of February 3, 2010
as written. Senator Hill seconded the motion and the motion carried by
voice vote.
Senator Bock made a motion to approve the minutes of February 8, 2010
as written. Senator Mortimer seconded the motion and the motion
carried by voice vote.

RS 19442C1

Relating to Civil Actions. Barbara Jordan, explained this fixes a
problem in the law. Under current law if an unmarried person suffers an
injury caused by another person and thereby incurs medical expenses
and other actual economic losses but later dies from an unrelated cause
prior to the responsible person paying for the expenses, the person or
insurance company that caused the problem is no longer responsible to
pay. However, when a married person in the same situation dies, the
spouse is allowed to continue the claim. This change in the law will
require liability insurance companies to pay for economic losses they
have insured instead of requiring the children or other heirs of the
unmarried person to pay the medical bills and other expense that were
incurred because of the carelessness of another person.

MOTION:

Senator Jorgenson made a motion to send RS 19442C1 to print.
Senator Kelly seconded the motion. The motion carried by voice vote.

RS 19537C1

Relating to Injury to Children. Senator Broadsword explained this
legislation would change section 18-501, Idaho Code, relating to felony
injury to a child. By adding an aggravated circumstance and increasing
the maximum penalty to 20 years in cases where there is great bodily
harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement to the child, the
judges will have the flexibility to award stiffer penalties when the situation
SENATE JUDICIARY AND RULES
February 10, 2010 - Minutes - Page 1

MINUTES

SENATE JUDICIARY AND RULES COMMITTEE

DATE:

February 24, 2010

TIME:

1:30 p.m.

PLACE:

RoomWV\/54

MEMBERS
PRESENT:

Chairman Darrington, Vice Chairman Jorgenson, Senators Davis, Lodge,
Hill, McKague, Mortimer, Kelly, and Bock

MEMBERS
ABSENT/
EXCUSED:
GUESTS:

The sign-in sheet, testimonies, and other related materials will be retained
with the minutes in the committee's office until the end of the session and
will then be located on file with the minutes in the Legislative Services
Library.

CONVENED:

Chairman Darrington called the meeting to order at 1:31 p.m.

MINUTES:

Senator Lodge made a motion to approve the minutes of February 10.
2010 as written. Senator Mortimer seconded the motion and the motion
carried by voice vote.
Senator Hill made a motion to approve the minutes of February 17, 2010
as written. Senator Kelly seconded the motion and the motion carried by
voice vote.

RS 19695

Relating to Rape; To Revise the Circumstances that Constitute Rape.
Senator Hill explained this legislation changes the definition of what is
commonly known as "statutory rape" as defined at 18-6101. Under
current law, sexual relations (as defined) with a girl who has not reached
the age of 18 is considered rape, even if both parties participate willingly.
This bill amends the definition of statutory rape to include such acts when
the offender is age 18 or older and the victim is under age 16 (rather than
18), or the victim is 16 or 17 and the offender is 3 or more years older
than the victim. Changes are also made to the male rape statute at 186108 to bring it into conformity with the provisions of the female rape
statue at 18-6101. This does not protect anyone over the age of 20.

MOTION:

Senator Mortimer made a motion to send RS 19695 to print. Senator
Jorgenson seconded the motion. The motion carried by voice vote.

S 1371

Relating to Producer Licensing. Roy Eiguren explained this legislation
clarifies that the Director of the Idaho Department of Insurance has the
exclusive authority to license bail bond agents in Idaho. The legislation
further provides that the Director shall also regulate bail agent
transactions subject to the inherent authority of the Idaho Supreme Court
to regulate the procedural aspects of bail transactions in the Idaho court
system.
SENATE JUDICIARY AND RULES
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Senator Jorgenson questioned if all seven judicial districts must accept
this rule as a uniform rule? Mr. Eiguren replied yes, this legislation will
clarify that all seven judicial districts will be subject to the uniform
licensing provisions of statutory law.
Michael Henderson, Attorney of the Court, spoke in favor of the
legislation, and reviewed the details of bail guidelines and statutory
guidelines.
Senator McKague asked what precipitated this legislation? Mr.
Henderson replied this makes clear the authority of when the courts take
action when there is misconduct and this shows communication between
the department and the courts. Senator McKague questioned if they are
currently required to have a background check? Mr. Henderson stated
they are, but only by their initial licensing.
MOTION:

Senator Jorgenson made a motion to send S 1371 to the floor with a do
pass recommendation. Senator Lodge seconded the motion. The
motion carried by voice vote.

S 1340

Relating to Civil Actions. Barbara Jordan explained that this fixes a
problem in the law. Under current law if an unmarried person suffers an
injury caused by another person and thereby incurs medical expenses
and other actual economic losses but later dies from an unrelated cause
prior to the responsible person paying for the expenses, the person or
insurance company that caused the problem is no longer responsible to
pay. However, when a married person in the same situation dies, the
spouse is allowed to continue the claim. This change in the law will
require liability insurance companies to pay for economic losses they
have insured instead of requiring the children or other heirs of the
unmarried person to pay the medical bills and other expense that were
incurred because of the carelessness of another person.
After reviewing the legislation, Ms. Jordan requested that the committee
would send S 1340 to the fourteenth order for amendment because in the
drafting of the legislation they neglected to make sure that the reference
on page 2, line 35, actually should say "section 5-311 (2) (a). Currently
the (a) is missing from the legislation.
Senator Mortimer inquired if the language on page 2, line 33, where it
states "if there be no personal representative appointed, then by those
persons who would be entitled to succeed." Would this include a health
and welfare claim, or an estate? Ms. Jordan replied, yes, if the
subrogated interest currently have a rate to be reimbursed for those
expenses and they can place things on the estate. This means the heirs
have to pay or the estate then has to reimburse the subrogated interest
for that and including the State of Idaho. This would then allow those
heirs or the estate to proceed against the individual that actually caused
the injury. Senator Mortimer stated, assuming there are no heirs, the
State would then have the right to bring the action and to follow through
with any claims in order to satisfy the obligation. Ms. Jordan responded
that was correct. the state has the right to place a lien on the estate.

SENATE JUDICIARY AND RULES
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David Luker, Idaho Trial Lawyers Association, went to the podium to
discuss subrogated rights. He also stated that they support sending
1340 to the fourteenth order for amendment.

S

Senator Jorgenson questioned page 1, line 27, when it states, "those
persons who would be entitled," would that exclude an estate if there are
no persons? Mr. Luker stated the referenced would include everyone
that is in Section 15-1-201, which is in the probate section, which is
defined as heirs.
Phil Barber, American Attorney's Association, stated that they agreed
with the Idaho Trial Lawyers Association.
MOTION:

Senator Bock made a motion to send S 1340 to the fourteenth order for
amendment. Senator Hill seconded the motion. The motion carried by
voice vote.

S 1341

Relating to Injury to Children. Senator Broadsword explained this
legislation would change section 18-501, Idaho Code, relating to felony
injury to a child. By adding an aggravated circumstance and increasing
the maximum penalty to 20 years in cases where there is great bodily
harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement to the child, the
judges will have the flexibility to award stiffer penalties when the situation
warrants such action. There would likely be no increase to the general
fund in the first few years, but if longer sentences are handed down it
could in future years add additional costs to the Department of
Corrections. There are currently 176 incarcerated inmates who have
been convicted of felony injury to a child. Of those, approximately one
third or 58 inmates received the maximum sentence. There is no way we
can know a definite number of increased costs. The department
estimates those increased costs two years after implementation could be
as low as $68,000 per year and as high as $236,000 depending upon
how many convictions and how many of those convicted receive the
maximum penalty.
Holly Koole, Idaho Prosecuting Attorney's Association, spoke in favor of
this legislation. Since it is difficult for children to protect themselves,
actions against them warrants stiffer penalties for offenders.
Senator Kelly inquired if this legislation had been reviewed by the
Supreme Court. Patti Tobias, Administrative Director for the Courts,
stated that the district judges review team was fine with the legislation.

MOTION:

Senator Jorgenson made a motion to send S 1341 to the floor with a do
pass recommendation. Senator Mortimer seconded the motion. The
motion carried by voice vote.

S 1312

Relating to the Child Protective Act. Senator Broadsword explained
this legislation relates to the Child Protective Act by amending section 161619, Idaho Code, to include felony injury to a child on the list of offenses
where the Department of Health and Welfare need not seek reunification
with the parent. By adding felony injury to a child and serious bodily injury
to a child to this list, the department can seek foster care and avoid going
through a lengthy and costly judicial process which is not in the best
SENATE JUDICIARY AND RULES
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House Judiciary, Rules & Administration Committee
Minutes
2010

MINUTES

HOUSE JUDICIARY, RULES AND ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE

DATE:

March 19, 201 0

TIME:

1:30 p.m.

PLACE:

Room EW42

MEMBERS:

Chairman Clark, Vice Chairman Smith(24), Representatives Nielsen,
Shirley, Wills, Hart, McGeachin, Bolz, Labrador, Luker, Kren, Boe,
Burgoyne, Jaquet, Killen

ABSENT/
EXCUSED:

Representatives Shirley, Wills, Labrador and Kren

GUESTS:

Bob Aldridge, Attorney; Sue Stadler; Daniel Lake; Michael Dennard,
Judiciary; Tracee Crawford, Treasure Valley Grandparents as Parents;
Marisa Mackley, Citizen; Georgia Mackley, Kincare Coalition; Patti
Tobias, Courts; John Watts, Voices for Children; Vikki Miller, Idaho Voices
for Children; Paul Panther, Attorney General's office; Barbara Jorden,
Idaho Trial Lawyers Assn., Brandon Philips, Idaho Department of
Correction, Diane Schwarz, Idaho Voices for Children; Fairy Hitchcock,
Advocate; Director Brent Reinke, Idaho Department of Correction
Chairman Clark called the meeting to order at 1:30 p.m.

MOTION:

Representative Bolz moved to approve the minutes of the meeting held
on March 17, 2010, as written. Motion carried by voice vote.

S 1340a:

The Chairman recognized Barbara Jorden, Idaho Trial Lawyers
Association to explain the bill. This bill fixes a loophole in the law. Under
current law, if an unmarried person suffers an injury caused by another
person and incurs medical expenses and other actual economic losses,
but later dies from an unrelated cause prior to the responsible person
paying for the expenses, the person or insurance company that caused
the problem is no longer responsible to pay. However, when a married
person in the same situation dies, the spouse is allowed to continue the
claim.
This change in the law will require liability insurance companies to pay for
economic losses they have insured instead of requiring the children or
other heirs of the unmarried person to pay the medical bills and other
expenses that were incurred because of the carelessness of another
person.
The amendment simply adds an "(a)" on page 2 of the bill in line 35 which
was inadvertently left out when the bill was crafted.

MOTION:

Representative Smith moved to send S 1340a to the floor with a DO
PASS recommendation. Motion carried by voice vote. Representative
Smith will carry the bill on the floor.

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
RS19442Cl
This fixes a problem in law. Under current law if an unmarried person suffers an injury caused
by another person and thereby incurs medical expenses and other actual economic losses but later
dies from an unrelated cause prior to the responsible person paying for the expenses, the person
or insurance company that caused the problem is no longer responsible to pay. However, when a
married person in the same situation dies, the spouse is allowed to continue the claim.
'''
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This change in the law will require Jiabi}ity "insurance corfipaniesto pay for economic losses they
have insured instead of requiring the children or other heirs of the llnmarried person to pay the
medical bills and other expenses that were incwred
because of the carelessness of another person.
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FISCAL NOTE·
None

Contact:
Name: Senator Joe Stegner
Office: Rm. 430
Phone: (208) 332-1308

Statement of Purpose/ Fiscal Note

S 1340

LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Sixtieth Legislature
Second Regular Session -

2010

IN THE SENATE
SENATE BILL NO. 1340
BY JUDICIARY AND RULES COMMITTEE

9

AN ACT
RELATING TO CIVIL ACTIONS; AMENDING SECTION 5-311, IDAHO CODE, TO REFERENCE
A CODE SECTION IN RELATION TO THE DEFINITION OF A TERM, TO PROVIDE A
CORRECT CODE REFERENCE AND TO MAKE TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS; AND AMENDING
SECTION 5-327, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE FOR THE CONTINUATION OF CERTAIN
CAUSES OF ACTION RELATING TO PERSONAL INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE UPON
THE DEATH OF THE INJURED PERSON, TO LIMIT DAMAGES AND TO PROVIDE FOR THE
COMMENCEMENT OR CONTINUATION OF SUCH ACTIONS BY THE DECEDENT'S PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OR HEIRS.
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Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:

11

SECTION 1. That Section 5-311, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby
amended to read as follows:

1
2
3
4
5

6
7

8

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21

22
23

24
25
26

27
28
29

30
31

32
33

34
35
36

37
38
39

40
41

42

5-311.
SUIT FOR WRONGFUL DEATH BY OR AGAINST HEIRS OR PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVES -- DAMAGES. ( 1) When the death of a person is caused
by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his or her heirs or personal
representatives on their behalf may maintain an action for damages against
the person causing the death, or in case of the death of such wrongdoer,
against the personal representative of such wrongdoer,
whether the
wrongdoer dies before or after the death of the person injured. If any other
person is responsible for any such wrongful act or neglect, the action may
also be maintained against such other person, or in case of his or her death,
his or her personal representatives. In every action under this section,
such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case as may be
just.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, and subsection
(2) of section 5-327, Idaho Code, "heirs" mean~:
(a) Those persons who would be entitled to succeed to the property of
the decedent according to the provisions of subsection (2+1) of section
15-1-201, Idaho Code.
(b) Whether or not qualified under subsection (2) (a) of this section,
the decedent's spouse, children, stepchildren, parents, and, when
partly or wholly dependent on the decedent for support or services,
any blood relatives and adoptive brothers and sisters.
It includes
the illegitimate child of a mother, but not the illegitimate child of
the father unless the father has recognized a responsibility for the
child's support.
1. "Support" includes contributions in kind as well as money.
2.
"Services" mean,:2_ tasks, usually of a household nature,
regularly performed by the decedent that will be a necessary
expense to the heirs of the decedent.
These services may vary
according to the identity of the decedent and heir and shall be
determined under the particular facts of each case.
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(c) Whether or not qualified under subsection (2) (a) or (2) (b) of this
section, the putative spouse of the decedent, if he or she was dependent
on the decedent for support or services. As used in this subsection,
"putative spouse" means the surviving spouse of a void or voidable
marriage who is found by the court to have believed in good faith that
the marriage to the decedent was valid.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to change or modify the
definition of "heirs" under any other provision of law.
SECTION 2. That Section 5-327, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby
amended to read as follows:
5-327.
PERSONAL INJURIES -- PROPERTY DAMAGE -- DEATH OF WRONGDOER -DEATH OF INJURED PARTY -- SURVIVAL OF ACTION. fil Causes of action arising
out of injury to the person or property, or death, caused by the wrongful
act or negligence of another, except actions for slander or libel, shall
not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer, and each injured person or the
personal representative of each one meeting death, as above stated, shall
have a cause of action against the personal representative of the wrongdoer;
provided, however, the punitive damages or exemplary damages shall not be
awarded nor penal ties adjudged in any such action; provided, however, that
the injured person shall not recover judgment except upon some competent,
satisfactory evidence corroborating the testimony of said injured person
regarding negligence and proximate cause.
J1J.. A cause of action for personal injury or property damage caused by
the wrongful act or negligence of another shall not abate upon the death of
the injured person from ca uses not related to the wrongful act or negligence.
Provided however, that the damages that may be recovered in such action are
expressly limited to those for:
(i) medical expenses actually incurred,
(ii) other out-of-pocket expenses actually incurred, and (iii) loss of
earnings actually suffered, prior to the death of such injured person and as
a result of the wrongful act or negligence. Such action shall be commenced
or, if already commenced at the time of the death of the injured person, shall
be thereafter prosecuted by the personal representative of the estate of
the deceased person or, if there be no personal representative appointed,
then by those persons who would be entitled to succeed to the property of the
deceased person according to the provisions of section 5-311 ( 2), Idaho Code.

